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Appointed public officials and public relations 
practice: issues of accountability, ethics and 
professionalism in the ‘children overboard’ affair. 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper examines the performance of the Australian Defence Department’s Public 
Affairs and Corporate Communications Division (PACCD) in relation to public 
statements by Ministers of the Crown that children were thrown overboard from a 
‘Suspected Illegal Entry Vessel’, off the Australian territory of Christmas Island on 
October 7, 2001. It concludes that public affairs officials in the Department of Defence 
failed to act in the public interest, however construed, and did not act in accordance with 
the Values Statement of the Australian Public Service, nor the Code of Ethics of the 
Public Relations Institute of Australia. 
 
Introduction 
 
Ever since the fall of Vietnam, governments and the military in liberal democratic 
countries have been mindful of the need to have strong community support for actions 
undertaken by their armed forces even when these activities are designated as “peace-
keeping”. The consequence has been the creation of large public affairs units in the 
military staffed by both military and civilian officials, and an imperative on the part of 
military commanders and their civilian masters to manage the news in times of conflict, 
as happened in the Falklands (Knightly, 1982; Morrison and Tumber, 1988), the 1991 
conflict against Iraq known as the Gulf War (Kellner, 1992; Nohrsteadt, 1992; 
MacArthur, 1992; Schiller, 1992; Flanders, 1991) and more recently in Afghanistan 
(Taylor, 2002, 2001; Etzioni, 2001; Kiefer, 2001; Gordon, 2001; Jurkowitz, 2001). Louw 
(2001, pp. 171-188) has termed this “PR-izing war”. 
 
Even so, such appointed public officials  - public servants - in public relations roles have 
a number of obligations. Their first obligation is that of all public officials, which is to 
serve “the public interest”, while recognising that defining what constitutes “the public 
interest” is problematic. Secondly, appointed public officials also have a set of 
obligations to the profession and practice of public relations, obligations which are best 
set out in the various codes of conduct, codes of professional practice or codes of conduct 
promulgated by professional associations of public relations practitioners. 
 
This paper examines the manner in which both these obligations were discharged by 
public officials in the Australian Defence Department’s Public Affairs and Corporate 
Communications Division in relation to what has become known as “the children 
overboard” affair, or as the Australian Senate termed it, “a certain maritime incident”. 
The “children overboard” affair has become a symbol of many diverse issues of concern 
to Australians such as compassion for displaced people, institutional trust, political truth 
telling, bureaucratic accountability, and border protection. This paper does not attempt to 
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canvass these issues although it does touch tangentially on some. It simply aims to 
measure what happened against promulgated organisational and professional standards. 
 
Children overboard affair 
 
In September 2001, the Department of Defence assumed responsibility for border 
protection from the Department of Customs. This engagement was named Operation 
Relux. What happened, and more particularly what didn’t happen, in the seas around the 
Australian territory around Christmas Island on October 7 when the Australian Navy 
encountered a vessel containing 223 people seeking asylum in Australia, has been widely 
canvassed in the Australian Parliament, through two departmental reports tabled by the 
Prime Minister (Bryant, 2002; Powell, 2001), and by Senate Committees (SEC 
Transcripts, 2002; SSC Report, 2002), in the mass media, and by political scientists 
(Weller, 2002). In essence, a mistake was made in the initial reporting through the 
Defence Department chain of command that children on the vessel were thrown 
overboard. Within hours, this information was made public by government ministers 
embarking on an election campaign, in which issues of border protection and national 
security were to dominate. The erroneous information was never publicly corrected and 
there is extensive evidence to suggest that prior to the election on November 10, public 
officials, ministerial staff and the outgoing Minister for Defence, acted in a way that 
shielded the Prime Minister from formal, written advice that the event never took place. 
 
The second issue which arose out of the initial incorrect information was the release on 
November 10 – in response to media demands for evidence  - of photographs purporting 
to show children thrown overboard on October 7. The photographs released were 
uncaptioned, and were in fact of the rescue of the passengers on the vessel when it sank 
the following day, October 8. 
 
At the core of the issues of accountability and the public interest, is the fact that at no 
point did three key officials involved in this affair make themselves available to the 
Senate Select Committee – the former Defence Minister Peter Reith and his advisers 
Scrafton and Hampton. This is despite requests from the Committee to appear. Nor did 
the Committee exercise, to the fullest extent, its powers to call them. 
 
Media management of defence information 
 
The Public Affairs and Corporate Communications Division (PACCD) of the Department 
of Defence consisted of some 148 permanent public service positions and an additional 
68 contact positions (Courier-Mail Oct 3 2002, p 2.) Within the civilian-military diarchy, 
of the Department of Defence - Secretary Hawke’s purist view of which the Senate Select 
Committee strongly criticised (SSC Report, p. xxix) - the PACCD was essentially 
civilian.  
 
In the period under review – October and November 2001 - Defence personnel were 
subject to two sets of instructions in relation to dealing with the media. The first, Defence 
Instructions (General) were issued on 8 August 2001 and represented a significant change 
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of practice from that prevailing in the Department up to that date. Indeed, this set of 
instructions was reviewed by the incoming Minister of Defence after the election, and 
quite astonishingly, the new set of instructions described by Secretary Hawke as “a much 
more flexible approach”, was signed off by Hawke and Chief of the Defence Force, 
Admiral Barrie the very day the Senate hearings commenced (SSC Transcripts, p. 27). 
Subsequently the Select Committee was to recommend that Defence develop, “a 
statement of Preferred Public Affairs Protocols to serve as guidelines by which future 
ministerial directives concerning public communications might be formulated”, designed 
to  “optimise the autonomy of the ADF and the Department of Defence in deciding the 
level and nature of operational information communicated direct to the press and the 
public” (SSC Report, p. xxxiv). 
 
The approach of the 8 August DI(G) was described by the head of PACCD, Jennifer 
McKenry (SSC Transcripts, p. 1119) as “more prescriptive” and “more disciplined” and 
“a process which would ensure that messages that went to the public were co-ordinated in 
a particular way”. The policy had several key elements which served to manage the 
information flow: 
 
• Service chiefs (of Army, Navy and Air Force), who curiously to the lay observer, 
were not part of the operational chain of command, were provided with a 
“strategic communications advisor”. The intention, no doubt, was to prevent 
precisely the type of faux pax committed by Navy Chief, Vice Admiral David 
Shackleton in a doorstop at HMAS Stirling in Perth on November 8.which 
contradicted the government line on children thrown overboard. 
• All media releases were to be signed off by a Canberra based officer of one-star 
rank or above. This, naturally, simply served to increase the frustration of service 
personnel on the ground and journalists. 
• Only those who had completed PACCD training programs in media relations 
were permitted to speak to the media, and were required to consult PACCD about 
“talking points”. 
 
The August 8 DI(G) represented what McKenry called “a change of culture” at the 
grassroots of the organisation. McKenry acknowledged that “people may have felt a bit 
of…disempowerment” (SSC Transcripts,  p.1119). It also represented an enormous lack 
of trust in the organisation by its senior managers. 
 
McKenry defended the August 8 DI(G) changes saying, “There were opportunities …for 
people at the grassroots level to do what they had always done. It was just a matter of 
informing up the chain” (SSC Transcripts, p.1119). Aware of discontent within the ranks, 
PACCD subsequently took the document “around the country…and asked people 
whether there were changes that we should or should not make” (SSC Transcripts, p. 
1119). That information, according to McKenry, was reflected in the revised document 
issued in March 2002, a document which Hawke characterised as being a reflection of 
Hill’s approach as Minister (SSC Transcripts, p.27). Unless the more prescriptive, 
disciplined and co-ordinated process represented by the August 8 DI(G) was part of an 
explicitly political attempt by Reith to control defence information flows, then 
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professional public relations practice would suggest that stakeholder consultation should 
precede promulgation of the document, rather than follow it. Moreover, such a policy 
appears contrary to Hawke’s philosophical position, expressed in 1997: 
 
Rational secretaries are more likely today to focus their energies on 
improving the capacity of their organisations to produce good advice in 
the first place, than on trying to control tightly everything conveyed by 
their organisations to the minister or the public (Hawke, 1997, p.152). 
 
In addition to general instructions, there were a specific set of instructions on dealing 
with the media in relation to Operation Relux. The essence of this instruction was that all 
information released to the media in relation to Operation Relux came from the office of 
the Defence Minister. The strategy behind this directive was administered by PACCD, a 
strategy of which Secretary Hawke had this to say: “I knew there was one, but I am not 
aware of the details” (SCC Transcripts, p.35). 
 
The place of ministerial advisors in the Australian variant of the Westminster system has 
been widely canvassed in the literature (Maley, 2000a, 2000b;Fitzgerald, 1996; Hollway, 
1996; Ryan, 1995; Rudd, 1992; McMahon, 1991;Walter, 1986.) and it is not proposed to 
address those issues here except to report Weller’s evocative description of ministerial 
advisers as “junk-yard attack dogs” (p.72) and to observe that that function of ministerial 
media advisors is self-evidently a public relations function, and is deserving of more 
attention from communication scholars, scholars of applied ethics as well political 
scientists. Significantly, the Senate Select Committee recommended development of a 
Code of Conduct for ministerial staff, “commensurate with Conduct and Values 
provisions that apply within the Australian Public Service” (SSC Report, p. xxxv). 
 
It is also worth noting that Operation Relux, unlike the deployment of troops to 
Afghanistan – a deployment which occurred at the same time as Operation Relux - was 
not an engagement in war. It was a border protection operation, a police action, 
performed in the absence of an effective coastal protection force by the armed forces. Its 
target was not Islamic terrorists, but displaced people. So a police action performed by 
the Australian Navy was subject to more stringent media management practices than the 
war against terror. 
 
These directives not only generated the disagreement and dissent within the Australian 
Defence Force discussed above, but derision from journalists. In evidence before the 
Senate Select Committee, representatives of the Parliamentary Press Gallery were highly 
critical of both the directives and of the culture of the PACCD. Graeme Dobell of ABC 
Radio called the August 8 Defence Instruction (General) “a media policy which is anti-
media. It is a communications policy which is about not communicating” (SSC 
Transcripts, p.1309). The Australian Financial Review’s Geoffrey Barker said, “The 
whole history of PACC since it was set up was one of minimal disclosure about 
everything and not disclosing anything if they could possibly get away with it,” (SSC 
Transcripts, p.1307). News Ltd Defence correspondent Ian McPhedran told the Senate 
Select Committee: 
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… I did not write much about the Defence Instructions (General) because, 
frankly, I do not understand it. I would defy anybody to read it and give 
me an explanation as to what it means. I do not really think it is coherent; I 
think it is incoherent and unreasonable (SSC Transcripts, p.1301). 
 
The Gallery’s submission to the Senate Select Committee wrote that “the high level of 
deliberate deception. . . could not have been perpetrated without the involvement of 
senior and junior public servants’ and of the “‘blatant political manipulation of the 
bureaucracy” (PPG, 2002, p. 1). The journalists continued: 
 
Senior officials such as the Secretary of Defence, Dr Allan Hawke, and 
defence chief Admiral Chris Barrie went along with a direction to refer all 
media questioning of the untrue ‘children overboard’ claims back to Mr. 
Reith’s office (PPG, p.1). 
 
The Gallery was in no doubt that, “Secrecy was not used for operational reasons but to 
control information for maximum political effect” (PPG, p.2), and concluded, that “The 
phrase ‘operational secrecy’ is in danger of becoming a joke along the lines of ‘airline 
food’ and ‘reality television’” (PPG, p.3). This then is the context in which the failure by 
appointed public officials to act in the public interest occurs. 
 
Failure by public officials to act in the public interest 
 
Between October 7 and November 10 – election day – outside the office of the Minister 
of Defence, there were three failures of duty: 
 
• McKenry failed to follow Hawke’s instructions in relation to advising Scrafton 
about the photographs (SSC Transcripts, p.14, p.38), 
• Brigadier Gary Bornholt (Military Advisor to PACCD) failed to follow up with 
Hampton on October 11 (SSC Transcripts, p. 4), 
• Secretary Hawke failed to ensure Reith was provided with a formal written brief 
(SSC Transcripts, p.4). 
 
In only one instance, Hawke’s failure to advise Reith, was there any sense of 
accountability expressed. At time of his annual performance review, Hawke offered his 
resignation to Reith’s replacement Senator Robert Hill (SSC Transcripts, p.49). In 
September 2002, at the conclusion of his three year contract, Hawke’s appointment was 
not renewed (Walters, 2002, p. 6). Such has been the re-elected government’s pleasure 
with the performance of PACCD that the division has been reduced from 148 to 112 
positions with a further 68 contract positions under review (Courier-Mail Oct 3 2002, p 
2). 
 
McHenry defended her failure to pursue the issue of a correction in the following 
exchange with Senator John Faulkner before the Senate Select Committee (SSC 
Transcripts, p.1104): 
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Senator FAULKNER --You know, Ms McKenry, that there is a 
misrepresentation on these photographs right through for a month in the 
period of a federal election campaign, don't you? You know that is the 
case and you know it is not corrected. You had expected it to be corrected 
early in October and that is why you took certain administrative action. 
You expected the minister to correct the public record but he did not? 
Ms McKenry --That is correct. I took action to make sure that the 
minister's office was aware of the information. 
--And what did you do when no correction was made? 
Ms McKenry --I continued my work within the organisation as a public 
servant. I did not see it as appropriate, as I explained earlier in the 
estimates process, to enter the debate at all. I believed that what I had done 
and what some of my colleagues had done had been appropriate. We had 
informed the minister's office of the date on which the photographs were 
taken. We had informed them that the photographs as they were did not 
represent what they were purported to represent. I had informed certainly 
my head of department of that information and I did not believe, having 
done all of that, that it was appropriate for me to enter the debate in any 
other way. 
Pressed later by Faulkner, McKenry enlarged on her particular understanding of the role 
of an appointed public official (SSC Transcripts, p.1108): 
Senator FAULKNER --…You say that you gave the minister and his 
office an opportunity to correct the public record. What happens when 
they do not do it? You have said yourself that it should have been done 
sometime after noon on 11 October and that your actions gave the 
minister's office an opportunity to do that, but it did not happen. Does that 
mean you just absolve yourself of all responsibility?  
Ms McKenry --I do not take on the responsibility. As I said, I believe that 
I acted the way I should have acted as a public servant. We were in the 
middle of an election campaign, as has been noted. I did not believe that it 
was my role or the role of anyone else to enter the public debate on the 
matter, the information having been provided to the minister's office. 
Brigadier Bornholt and I were left in no doubt, as I conveyed also to the 
secretary to the department, that the senior adviser understood quite 
clearly what those photographs represented.  
McKenry’s use of the term “public debate” is most instructive. First, while there may 
have been a debate in Defence about whether children went overboard, there was no 
debate about the photographs. It was known to all appointed officials that the 
photographs were not of children being thrown overboard on October 7. Nor was there 
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public debate about these matters because there was no public knowledge of them. The 
public at this point – from October 11 until the first week in November - were completely 
in the dark and continued to be so until the final week of the election campaign 
principally because of decisions made in Reith’s office not to tell the truth. 
 
Compare this reluctance to pursue a correction of the public record with the alacrity with 
which the PACCD, the Defence Minister’s office, the Secretary of the Department of 
Prime Minister and Cabinet, and the Secretary, Department of Immigration and Ethnic 
Affairs all acted on November 8 when Navy chief Vice Admiral Shackleton was reported 
as saying “Our advice was that there were people being threatened to be thrown in the 
water, and I don’t know what happened to the message after that,” (SSC Transcripts,  
p.57). It was McKenry who negotiated the draft of Shackleton’s clarification, careful only 
to acknowledge that the government had been advised by Defence that children were 
thrown overboard, omitting any suggestion that Defence had concerns about the integrity 
of that original advice.  McKenry, closely pressed on this question in the Select 
Committee, refused to acknowledge that such an omission was improper. 
 
Performance measurement by ethical standards 
 
The Defence Department, particularly the Office of the Inspector-General has expended 
considerable energy over the past decade in ethics education and training, and fraud 
prevention, particularly in relation to procurement. The Department’s program has been 
held to be exemplary by it officials at a number of conferences on public sector ethics. 
 
In addition to the general notion of the public interest, there are three standards by which 
the behaviour of appointed public officials in public relations roles can be measured. The 
Australian Public Service (APS) Values Statement, APS Code of Conduct and the Public 
Relations Institute Code of Ethics. 
 
The Australian Public Service Values Statement 
 
The pertinent clauses of the APS Values Statement are as follows: 
 
The Australian Public Service:  
• is apolitical, performing its functions in an impartial and professional 
manner;  
• has the highest ethical standards;  
• is openly accountable for its actions, within the framework of Ministerial 
responsibility to the Government, the Parliament and the Australian public;  
• is responsive to the Government in providing frank, honest, comprehensive, 
accurate and timely advice and in implementing the Government's policies 
and programs;  
• delivers services fairly, effectively, impartially and courteously to the 
Australian public and is sensitive to the diversity of the Australian public;  
• has leadership of the highest quality (APS, 2002a). 
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APS Code of Conduct  
 
From this Statement flows a Code of Conduct for all federal employees. The Code of 
Conduct requires that an employee must:  
• behave honestly and with integrity in the course of APS employment;  
• act with care and diligence in the course of APS employment;  
• when acting in the course of APS employment, treat everyone with respect 
and courtesy, and without harassment;  
• comply with any lawful and reasonable direction given by someone in the 
employee's Agency who has authority to give the direction;  
• at all times behave in a way that upholds the APS Values and the integrity and 
good reputation of the APS (APS, 2002b). 
Public Relations Institute Code of Ethics 
 
The standards of professional conduct required are set down in the Code of Ethics of the 
Public Relations Institute of Australia (PRIA, 2001). The relevant clauses of the 
Australian Code are that: 
1. Members shall deal fairly and honestly with their employers, clients and 
prospective clients, with their fellow workers including superiors and 
subordinates, with public officials, the communications media, the general public 
and with fellow members of PRIA.  
2. Members shall avoid conduct or practices likely to bring discredit upon 
themselves, the Institute, their employers or clients.  
3. Members shall not knowingly disseminate false or misleading information and 
shall take care to avoid doing so inadvertently. 
While this code -updated in November 2001- is highly prescriptive, it nonetheless makes 
quite clear the obligations of public relations practitioners to deal fairly and honestly, to 
avoid action which will discredit the profession, and most particularly to avoid the 
dissemination of false or misleading information – even if inadvertent. Knowing that 
false and misleading information was in the public domain, McKenry had an ethical 
obligation under this code to pursue the matter, in the first instance with Secretary 
Hawke. Her argument about not wishing to enter what she termed “the public debate” 
(SSC Transcripts, p.1104) is not sustainable. To take up the matter with Hawke, her 
superior, is not to enter the public debate. Given Hawke’s subsequent views about the 
incident (SSC Transcripts, p. 4), it is highly likely that Hawke would have been 
persuaded to pursue the matter formally with Reith.  
The public interest 
 
The final test of the actions of the officials is: were they in the public interest? Defining 
what constitutes “the public interest” in a Westminster-derived system, such as has 
develop in Australia, is the subject of an extensive literature (Yates, 2001; Mulgan 2000a, 
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2000b; Shergold, 1997a, 1997b; Shubert 1960). One of the most useful 
conceptualisations is that of Nicholas Lovrich (1981) who set out four different ways in 
which appointed public officials perceive “the public interest”. The first perception – 
which Lovrich suggested back in 1981 was the most pervasive view – is that of “the duty 
of neutral service”. That appointed public officials owe their principal duty to serve the 
government of the day. That having provided frank and fearless advice to government, 
appointed public officials are there to execute the policies of the government of the day. 
The second perception is that the agency or program self interest is the most appropriate 
way to reflect what is in “the public interest”, and when all agency and program interests 
are worked through, that a consensus or conclusion that is in the public interest will 
emerge. The third perception, which Lovrich suggests arises out of the “new public 
management” approach is that the public interest is conflated with the promotion of 
social equity. The fourth perspective is that public preferences should determine how the 
public official understands and acts in the public interest. This approach derives from 
public choice advocates, an ideology of public administration which originated in the 
nineteen seventies. 
 
Lovrich makes the argument that the complexity of modern government enlarges the 
scope of the individual official to determine what is in the public interest, and certainly, 
in Australia, the development of mechanisms such as administrative appeals tribunals, 
judicial review and ombudsmen represent an institutional response to this. Two other 
extra-institutional developments which also serve to restrict the ability of appointed 
public officials to determine the public interest are significant here also. The expansion of 
ministerial staff over the past thirty years, and the emergence of “tribunes of the people” 
in the form of powerful, nationally-networked talk-back radio hosts, or “entertainers” as 
some prefer to be called. 
 
While McKenry argues for a position akin to Lovrish’s “duty of neutral service”, her acts 
of omission  - a “duty of no service” - render her position a partisan one. It was clearly in 
the public interest that the errors in the public domain be corrected, and the public 
interest, as distinct from the partisan political interest of the caretaker government, 
demanded correction, especially in the context of an election campaign. Reflection on the 
great Kantian principles of duty - universalisability and reciprocity - might have helped 
clarify what constituted the public interest, and one’s duty to it. 
 
Conclusion 
 
McKenry made a decision that the public interest lay in accepting Scrafton’s instructions 
over and against the specific instructions of her departmental head, Dr Allen Hawke. This 
is, of course, unacceptable, and a measure of its unacceptability can be found in the fact 
that Hawke offered his resignation to the Minister of Defence when the material fact of 
McKenry’s action came to light. McKenry also should have resigned, and her resignation 
should have been accepted. Moreover, McKenry should also have been the subject of 
action under the APS Code of Conduct. Brigadier Bornholt should also have fallen on his 
sword for his failure to follow up ministerial media advisor Hampton. Finally, were 
McKenry a member of the PRIA, she should also be subject to action under the PRIA 
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Code of Ethics for breaches of clauses 1,2 and 3 of that Code. PACCD officials may have 
convinced themselves they were acting in the public interest by not pursuing the issue of 
a correction with the office of the Minister. Their self-justifications before the Senate 
Committee, while illuminating, were not convincing, and not only damage the 
professional reputations of the individuals, but perpetuate the widespread community 
perception that the practice of public relations is inherently unethical.  
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